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Abstract
Between December 2007 and February 2009, Venezue-
lans participated twice in constitutional referenda where
the elimination of presidential term limits was one of
the most salient proposals. Assuming voter preferences
did not change significantly during that period, the ‘re-
peated’ character of these elections provide us with an ex-
cellent opportunity to apply forensic tools designed to de-
tect anomalies and outliers in election returns in elections
where electronic voting technologies were used. Similar
tools were first applied by Myagkov et al. ([20], [21],
[22], [23]) to the study of electoral fraud in Russia and
Ukraine, and were effective in the isolation of potential
cases of manipulation of electoral returns. The case of
Venezuela is different because there exists no widespread
agreement about the integrity or otherwise fraudulent na-
ture of national elections, and because it is a nation where
electronic voting technologies are used. Unless electoral
fraud takes place in exactly the same manner in each elec-
tion, an analysis of the ‘flow of votes’ between elections
can be used to detect suspicious patterns in electoral re-
turns. Although we do not find evidence of pervasive elec-
toral fraud compared, for instance, to the Russian case,
our analysis is useful to detect polling places or regions
deviating considerably from the more general pattern.
1 Introduction
Having an electoral process with a high degree of integrity
is important for the maintenance of a well-functioning
representative democracy. All stakeholders must believe
that an election was free from fraud and malfeasance in or-
der for the regime that takes power after a contested elec-
tion to have legitimacy. Elections that lack integrity often
∗Graduate student, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Cal-
ifornia Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, MC 228-77; cor-
responding author. E-mail:ilevin@hss.caltech.edu. Tel:(626)395-4289
†Undergraduate student, Division of Engineering & Applied Science,
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125.
‡Professor of Political Science, Division of Humanities and Social
Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125.
lead to internal political conflict, and to external political
pressures. An example of such an election occurred in
2004 in the Ukraine, where electoral fraud produced mas-
sive protests as well as pressure by foreign governments,
resulting in an eventual revote.
While examples of clear and widespread electoral fraud
are relatively rare, concerns have arisen in recent years
regarding the detection of fraud as new voting technolo-
gies and procedure are tested and deployed. These elec-
toral innovations often involve relatively untested tech-
nologies and procedures, which sometimes appear to in-
teract to produce potentially problematic outcomes. This
may have been the case in Florida’s 13th Congressional
district election in 2006, when a very high undervote rate
was observed in parts of the district in Sarasota County,
where electronic voting machines were used. While re-
cent research focuses on how the voting machines dis-
played the ballot for this race, considerable debate arose
about whether there were problems with the electronic de-
vices themselves (see Frisina, Herron, Honaker and Lewis
[12]).
The need to assure the integrity of an electoral pro-
cess has produced a variety of calls for better post-election
analysis of election administration, sparking a number of
new research efforts regarding official post-election audit-
ing procedures.1 Our research is closely related to these
efforts, as we study the issue of post-election statistical
detection of election anomalies and outliers. Of course,
the statistical analysis of election returns and other elec-
tion statistics has a long history, with scholars attempting
to identify statistically the systematic factors impacting
outcomes. Only recently, though, have scholars begun to
apply their substantive and methodological tools to look
not for the systematic explanatory factors of voting and
election outcomes, but also for outliers and anomalies not
accounted for by a classical statistical model.2
In this paper we discuss some of these new statistical
tools for post-election forensics, with an application to re-
1See, for example, Aslam, Popa and Rivest [4] or Hall [14], and the
references therein.
2See Part Three of Alvarez, Hall and Hyde [2] for discussion of many
of these different statistical tools.
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cent elections in Venezuela. We use the Venezuelan case
for a number of reasons: Recent elections have been im-
portant and concern widely-followed referenda on impor-
tant constitutional and political issues; we want to apply
these statistical tools to a nation where electronic voting
is used; finally, while there have been studies of election
fraud in a number of Latin American nations, the tech-
niques we present here have not been applied to Latin
American cases.
This essay proceeds as follows. In the next section we
discuss briefly the research literature on election fraud,
and the cross-cutting research literature on electronic vot-
ing. We then turn to a discussion of the Venezuelan case,
as well as a general presentation of post-election statistical
forensic analyses. Thereafter we examine the results from
recent Venezuelan elections, and conclude with a discus-
sion of the merits of these post-election statistical forensic
tools for fraud detection and routine auditing of election
administration practices.
2 Election Fraud and Electronic
Voting
Despite the frequent use of the term “election fraud”, there
is little guidance in the research literature about exactly
what constitutes “election fraud.” For example, Alvarez,
Hall and Hyde [2] note that notions of fraudulent elec-
toral practices vary across time and political jurisdictions,
and that behaviors that in one nation at a particular time
are thought of as fraudulent may be perfectly legal and
acceptable in other nations at other points in time. The
United States Election Assistance Commission (USEAC)
recently recognized this problem in a report on “election
fraud”, noting that it has“learned that these terms mean
many things to many different people” ([29], page 11);
as a consequence, the USEAC used the term “election
crimes” in their study instead of “election fraud.”
Regardless of how one defines “election fraud” across
nations or time, there are clear cases where deliberate and
illegal electoral manipulation have been observed. Latin
America, our region of focus, has experienced allegations
of election fraud in the past, and there has been substan-
tial research on these allegations in some Latin Ameri-
can cases. Two Latin American nations in particular have
been widely studied. One is Costa Rica, which was ex-
amined closely by Lehoucq and Molina [17]. Looking
across nearly fifty years of Costa Rican history (made pos-
sible in part by that country’s longstanding democracy),
they found that election fraud varied depending on po-
litical competition, political institutions, and sociological
trends. Another Latin American case that has seen sub-
stantial research is Mexico, where during the PRI’s pe-
riod of one-party rule, that party’s tactics included the
manipulation of voter registries, multiple voting, ballot
box stuffing and other forms of voter intimidation (Law-
son [18]). Others have studied the transition from PRI-
dominance to competitive elections, with a focus on how
political institutions like electoral courts can help mitigate
the manipulation of elections (Eisenstadt [10]). Predomi-
nantly, though, research on election fraud in Latin Amer-
ica focuses on systems employing “traditional” technolo-
gies, usually paper-based voting registration and ballot-
ing systems. As the examples from Costa Rica and Mex-
ico demonstrate, paper-based registration and ballot sys-
tems are not fraud-proof, instead they have many different
types of vulnerabilities that have been exploited in past
elections.
Missing from the literature are studies of the poten-
tial for election fraud that arise from the use of elec-
tronic voter registration and balloting systems (e.g., Al-
varez and Hall [1]). In the United States, a widespread
movement toward the greater use of electronic voting fol-
lowing the 2000 presidential election has proceed with fits
and starts, and at this moment in time has stalled or even
reversed itself (Alvarez and Hall [1]). Much of the de-
bate about electronic voting systems in the United States
concerns security and reliability; specifically, allegations
that malicious tampering with the software and hardware
is possible and difficult to detect (e.g., Kohno et al. [16]).
These allegations have been the focus of substantial popu-
lar press, and a growing body of research (State of Alaska
Division of Elections [27],[28]; California Secretary of
State [7]; Ohio Secretary of State [24]).
The electronic voting system currently used in
Venezuela was first introduced for the 2004 presidential
recall referendum, and has since been employed in five
national elections — three constitutional referenda, one
presidential election, and one parliamentary election. In
addition, it is used in regional and municipal races. The
touch-screen system is manufactured by Smartmatic, and
is an example of an electronic voting device commonly
known as a “direct-recording electronic” (DRE) voting
machine. The Carter Center [8] issued an observation
report of the 2006 presidential election that contains a
great deal of technical discussion of the electronic vot-
ing system used by Venezuela, and we draw heavily from
that report as it provides one of the best English-language
sources about the technical details of the voting system in
Venezuela.
The Carter Center [8] analysis covers in detail many of
the security features of the Smartmatic voting devices; in
fact, they devote an entire section of their report to a dis-
cussion of the security features of these voting systems.
Some of those features include encryption of voting infor-
mation, randomization of information to deter the recon-
struction of the sequence of voting, disabling unnecessary
physical access ports, chain-of-custody procedures, and
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the security of the system’s paper receipts. Overall, the
Carter Center report positively evaluated the voting sys-
tem security, though it did recommend stronger physical
security and chain-of-custody measures for future elec-
tions. The report specifically concluded that “The sys-
tem used in Venezuela needs to be secured (and audited)
it its entirety” ([8], page 29). However, following the
2006 presidential election, the Carter Center report noted
a number of issues associated with the audit and it’s pro-
cedures ([8], pages 40-42).
Thus, the research reported in the sections that follow
offers another set of post-election tools for election of-
ficials, stakeholders, and other interested parties to use,
and that thereby expands the more limited post-election
audit procedures employed thus far in recent Venezuelan
national elections. A post-election audit of only a small
random sample of voting machines from polling stations
may uncover some problems with the administration or
technology used in an election; the post-election forensic
tools we employ here are complementary to the random
audit, as they can help discover other anomalies or prob-
lems with the conduct of a particular election. The ad-
vantage of our tools, on the other hand, is that they are
designed to operate over the complete set of election re-
turns.
3 Previous Research
The forensic tools applied here to detect election fraud
using aggregate official election statistics were initially
developed to study election fraud in post-Soviet states,
notably Russia and Ukraine (Myagkov, Ordeshook and
Shakin [21], [22], [23]). Briefly, those tools seek to dis-
cover the anomalies in the data occasioned by explicit
forms of fraud, such as ballot box stuffing and falsified
election protocols that introduce specific types of hetero-
geneity into the data. Indeed, the search for ‘artificially’
created heterogeneity both defines our methodology and
establishes the prerequisites for its application.
We know that election returns from any national elec-
tion exhibits their own natural forms of heterogeneity.
Both turnout and a candidate or party’s support will, gen-
erally and quite naturally, vary with demographic param-
eters such as urbanization, income levels, ethnic compo-
sition and even simply region. Our tools, then, seek to
control for these parameters and then to look for other,
potentially suspicious, sources. Of course, whether we
deem these other sources suspicious depends on what we
know about the election at hand. For instance, does the
election involve a ‘favorite son’ who can be expected to
wholly legitimately garner special support in some re-
gions but not in others? Did the election concern an is-
sue that had previously been unimportant — an issue that
divided the electorate differently than before? Naturally,
a concern with such things requires that in the search for
suspicious heterogeneity, we must also look across elec-
tions so that we can answer questions such as ‘Did a pat-
tern suddenly emerge in the data that cannot be explained
by demographic shifts?’
In contending with these substantive issues along with
the various methodological issues associated with the
treatment of aggregate data, Russia and Ukraine proved
a useful laboratory for the development and testing of our
forensic tools. Briefly, in Russia, Myagkov, Ordeshook
and Shakin [23] had reasonably good priors as to where
specifically election fraud was most likely to arise — no-
tably in its ethnic republics, such as Tatarstan, Bahkor-
tostan, Dagestan and Ingueshtia. Each region is controlled
by political bosses (republic presidents) who generally
win elections with numbers mimicking a Soviet past; both
turnout and support for the incumbent in excess of ninety
percent. In addition, it is not unusual to find subregions
(rayons) in which the majority of precincts report 100 per-
cent turnout with 100 percent of the vote going to the re-
gional or national incumbent or to the Kremlin sanctioned
party. Data from these regions should readily signal fraud
and should distinguish themselves from data from other
regions.
Ukraine, in turn, offered Myagkov et al. [23] nearly
the perfect social science experiment in 2004 from the
perspective of testing their forensic tools. Following
an inconclusive first round presidential ballot in Octo-
ber, the November runoff pitted two candidates, Viktor
Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovich, with sharply differ-
ing ideologies and bases of support. Yushchenko’s sup-
port, with his pro-NATO and reformist agenda, came
largely from Western Ukraine, whereas Yanukovich’s
support cam from the more industrialized and largely pro-
Russian East (along with Crimea). Yanukovich also re-
ceived the strong support of the incumbent regime along
with Russia’s Vladimir Putin.
The second November runoff election, however, was
marred by massive and readily documented irregulari-
ties — irregularities of such an extent that, in addition
to a massive uprising among the population termed ‘The
Orange Revolution’ that saw upwards of a half million
Ukrainians permanently camped out in protest in Kyiv’s
central square, Ukraine’s Supreme Court invalidated the
result and called for a new runoff in December. As a
consequence of the Court’s decision and the self-evident
nature of the fraud (along with, doubtlessly, behind the
scenes diplomatic maneuvering), Yanukovich lost the en-
dorsement of then president Kuchma (thereby signal-
ing to regional political bosses that ‘special efforts’ on
Yanukovich’s behalf were no longer necessary), and sev-
eral thousand election observers from Ukraine’s diaspora
(notably, from Canada and the United States) poured into
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the country to monitor the re-runoff. Ukraine, then, pre-
sented the authors with a situation in which they had two
elections, one month apart, contested by the same two
candidates, with the same issues, among the same elec-
torate but with considerably fewer opportunities and in-
centives for fraud in the second runoff. And since they
had good priors as to where fraud was most blatant in the
November runoff, they could test their indicators with the
expectation that those indicators would signal fraud in one
case but not in the other and that the measures they pro-
vided of the magnitude of fraud should correspond to the
estimates offered by a variety of objective observers and
journalistic accounts. Suffice it to say, those indicators
performed as designed and suggested the presence of be-
tween 2 and 3 million ‘suspect’ votes in the November
2004 Ukrainian presidential runoff.3
4 The Case of Venezuela
We started the Venezuela analysis without strong priors
about the types and location of potential election anoma-
lies or potential fraud, or even expectations about whether
there were problems in recent elections. The electoral
context in this country is considerably different from that
described in the Russian and Ukrainian cases. First, in the
three most recent national elections, there are few polling
places with 100 percent turnout where the official posi-
tion, or any other alternative, wins close to 100 percent
of the vote. Even in regions with strong support for the
government, the opposition wins a ‘reasonable’ positive
share of the vote. Second, international observers such as
the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU-
EOM) positively evaluated recent electoral processes. For
example, in their report on the 2006 presidential contest,
the EUEOM congratulated the National Elections Coun-
cil (CNE), as well political actors and social movements,
for “creating conditions to hold elections that are accept-
able to all stakeholders” and argued that “the electronic
voting system established in Venezuela is efficient, se-
cure, and auditable” (EUEOM [11], page 2). Election ob-
servers pointed to minor irregularities and suggested im-
provements to the electoral system, but they did not raise
serious allegations of electoral malfeasance. Although lo-
cal organizations — such as SUMATE, as well as the op-
position — made great efforts to monitor and report inci-
dents of fraud, there exists no proof of widespread irreg-
ularities in recent elections. The most notable case of an
election where Chavez’s position won a disproportionate
share of the vote is the 2005 parliamentary contest, where
the Movimiento V Repblica (MVR) obtained 116 out of
3Similar tools were applied to the 2004 Russian presidential election,
2007 Russian parliamentary election, and 2007 Ukrainian election (see
Myagkov et al. [22], [23]).
167 seats in Venezuela’s National Assembly. This lop-
sided victory occurred, however, because the opposition
boycotted the election, alleging there were not enough
guarantees for a free and fair vote. Unsurprisingly, the
opposition’s participation and vote share was small and
overall turnout only reached 25.3 percent.
Some of the main opposition arguments about the non-
democratic character of the government relate to the con-
stitutionality of the articles included in the 2007 and 2009
constitutional referenda. The 2007 referendum consisted
of, among other things, the removal of presidential term
limits, abolishing the autonomy of the central bank, grant-
ing the president control over international currency re-
serves, expropriation of large land estates, and reducing
the work day from eight to six hours. People opposed
to Chavez’s ‘reforms’ argued this last provision was in-
troduced merely as a sweetener to attract votes. In De-
cember 2007, citizens voted on two bundles of constitu-
tional changes, one of them (bundle A) containing all the
reforms originally proposed by Chavez, including the un-
limited reelection proposal. Paradoxically, it was the op-
position boycott of the 2005 election that gave Chavez an
overwhelming majority in the National Assembly and al-
lowed Chavez to readily include his favored proposals in
the 2007 referendum. Still, Chavez’s position lost by a
small margin, which shows that the Venezuelan case dif-
fers significantly from the Russian or Ukrainian cases pre-
viously summarized.
After the 2007 defeat, Chavez accepted the outcome but
publicly warned that this was just a temporary defeat —
he said “no pudimos, por ahora”, meaning “for the mo-
ment, we couldn’t” making allusion to the phrase he used
when surrendering after the 1992 attempted coup d’tat.
After the referendum, banners appeared throughout Cara-
cas showing the phrase “por ahora” (“for the moment”).
Moreover, while the constitution does not allow a sim-
ilar constitutional reform to be put to a vote twice dur-
ing the same National Assembly period, Chavez came up
with a new proposal which excluded most of the 2007 re-
forms, but still included the unlimited reelection proposal,
together with the elimination of reelection terms for other
public offices, and managed to get approval from the Con-
stitutional Court for holding a new referendum in Febru-
ary 2009. In this context, it is reasonable to wonder to
which extent the integrity of the electoral process would
be preserved in 2009.
The data about electoral returns we use here to address
this issue comes from two sources. First, we downloaded
the 2007 and 2009 referendum results from the CNE web-
page using a Python script to store the data in a spread-
sheet. Later, we found it convenient to compare the refer-
endum outcomes with those from the 2006 presidential
election. The data corresponding to this last race was
downloaded from the ESDATA website, which contains
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spreadsheets with official election results at the lowest
level of aggregation available.4 In addition, in different
sections of our analysis we classify polling places, or con-
trol for socio-demographic differences, using census in-
formation. This data was downloaded from the web page
of the National Statistics Institute (INE).5
5 Methodology
Briefly, our forensic indicators fall into three categories.
The first looks for anomalies in the distribution of turnout
and the relationship between turnout and a candidate or
party’s reported share of the eligible electorate, the sec-
ond looks for anomalies in the patterns of the numbers —
the digits — employed in official protocols, and the last
category applies various econometric techniques to esti-
mate the flow of votes between elections.
With respect to the first category, suppose we in fact
have a homogeneous data set (e.g., polling stations or
precincts) in the sense that turnout varies within it for
purely random reasons, for reasons having little if any-
thing to do with demographic parameters or with those
factors that impact a candidate or party’s level of support.
In this case the overall distribution of turnout across the
data should be approximately normally (and in particu-
lar, unimodally) distributed, with some districts reporting
high turnout, some reporting low turnout, but the over-
whelming majority reporting turnout rates at or near the
average. Now, however, suppose we introduce a specific
form of heterogeneity into the data by literally stuffing
the ballot boxes of a subset of precincts with votes for a
specific candidate. The turnout distribution of that sub-
set will be moved to the right so as to create an elongated
tail for the overall distribution. And if we stuff enough
ballots into those boxes, we can actually create an over-
all bimodal distribution. Bimodal distributions of turnout,
then, are one of the ‘red flags’ we can use when looking
for fraudulently cast votes.
Next, suppose we look at the relationship between
turnout and a candidate’s share of the eligible electorate.
Again, if turnout is unrelated to a party’s relative support,
that relationship (i.e., the slope of the line relating turnout,
T, to share of the eligible electorate, V/E) should approx-
imately equal the party’s overall share of the vote in our
sample of the data. In other words, suppose turnout in-
creases by 100 people. Then if turnout is unrelated to the
party’s support relative to the opposition, that party should
enjoy a share of those 100 additional voters equal approx-
4The ESDATA web site is http://www.esdata.info/venezuela. To
check the accuracy of the data available in this location, we compared
their 2009 referendum database, with the one we constructed with the
data downloaded from the CNE, and results were 100% consistent.
5The INE webpage is www.ine.gov.ve, and the section we down-
loaded the data from is called “Sı´ntesis Estadı´stica Estatal 2008.”
imately to its general share of the vote. Surely it should
not gain more than 100 votes, nor should it experience any
loss in votes. Thus, regression estimates of the relation-
ship between V/E and T in homogeneous data should fall
in the interval [0,1], so once again, regression estimates
outside of this interval serve as another indicator of po-
tentially fraudulently reported votes.
The second category of forensic indicators examines
patterns in digits in official election returns (Berber and
Scacco [5], Shpilkin [26]).6 Suppose for example that
election protocols are filled out with little or no regard
for ballots actually cast. And suppose, moreover, as is
actually the case in places such as Russia, that there are
few penalties for committing fraud, provided only that the
fraud benefits the incumbent regime. In this case we can
readily imagine a heuristic for filling out protocols — say,
officially reported turnout — in which numbers are simply
rounded off to 0 or 5. Looking at the distribution of last
digits, then, can serve as an additional piece of forensic
evidence. But suppose those who would commit fraud at-
tempt to be more sophisticated and deliberately avoid the
over-use of 0’s and 5’s. So consider instead the last two
digits of official tabulations. It is an experimentally veri-
fied fact that if we ask people to write sequences of ran-
dom numbers, they will tend to write down paired num-
bers (e.g., 2 2 or 3 3 or 7 7) less frequently than we would
actually expect in a purely random sequence (Chapanis
[9], Rath [25], Boland and Hutchinson [6]). A fourth ‘red
flag’, then, is a distribution of last and next-to-last digits
that departs significantly from what we would expect from
a purely random process.
An additional forensic indicator entails estimating the
‘flow of votes’ from one election to the next. Here, of
course, we are attempting to estimate where the votes
of one party or candidate (or position on a referendum)
went to in successive elections with the expectation that
no party or candidate should win more than 100% of the
vote of some earlier candidate or party. Needless to say,
treating aggregate data so as to obtain estimates of this
sort encounter any number of problems associated with
ecological correlation. Nevertheless, a variety of econo-
metric techniques have been developed for treating such
issues, and their application constitutes our final forensic
indicator. Specifically, we estimate Goodman regressions
of the following form:
y1i = β11x1i + β12x2i + β13(1− x1i − x2i) (1)
y2i = β21x1i + β22x2i + β23(1− x1i − x2i) (2)
6There are other scholars who also study patterns in digits to detect
electoral fraud. For instance, Mebane [19] looks for deviations from
the ‘second-digit Benford’s law’. In this paper, we follow a different
approach, by searching for patterns of non-random behavior in the dis-
tribution of the last-two digits.
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y3i = β31x1i + β32x2i + β33(1− x1i − x2i) (3)
where each yi represents a share of the eligible elec-
torate we want to explain - yes, no and abstention pro-
portions in the case of referenda, and the xi’s indicate the
proportions of people voting for the government’s favorite
alternative, for the opposition’s favorite alternative, or ab-
staining in a previous election. Each β coefficient repre-
sents the proportion of a previous vote share that ‘flows’
to each alternative in the most recent election. Therefore,
these coefficients should lie between 0 and 1. Further, as-
suming no change in the electorate, any voter must either
abstain, or vote for one of the available alternatives. Thus,
coefficients lying in a similar column — i.e., those associ-
ated with the same xi, should add to one across the three
equations. If this holds, the nine β coefficients should add
to three, predicted yi’s should lie between zero and one,
and the sum of the predicted yi’s should add to one.
Still, since we do not use individual level data, aggre-
gation bias may lead to estimated coefficients that are out
of bounds. The usual solution applied in the literature has
been to use an estimation method restricting coefficients
to lie within ‘theoretically prescribed’ bounds (King [15]).
Myagkov et al. [23], however, argue that electoral fraud
may lead to negative or above-one coefficients even in
the absence of aggregation issues, so restricting the co-
efficients is not desirable because it does not allow us
to detect cases of electoral fraud. Still, to correctly as-
sess the cause of an out-of-bounds coefficient, we need to
take steps to mitigate the ecological inference problem.
Myagkov et al. [23] use a semi-parametric procedure,
which consists of estimating the model within clusters of
similar regions, and then constructing a weighted average
of the coefficients to obtain the overall results. In this pa-
per, we employ a method with a similar aim. Specifically,
we estimate Goodman regressions with random effects,
where coefficients are allowed to vary by region, or to
vary by levels of census variables.7 This procedure can
be thought of as the intermediate step between a complete
pooling approach where the model is estimated at the na-
tional level without random effects, and a no-pooling ap-
proach where the model is estimated independently within
each region.
Finally, an additional method we use to detect anoma-
lies in electoral results follows a test done by Alvarez and
Katz [3]. The authors first fit a model to the 1998 gov-
ernor and senate election results in the state of Georgia,
using the results of the 1996 presidential election as ex-
planatory variables. Then, they use the estimated coef-
ficients to predict the 2002 election results. In that way,
they seek to detect if outcomes deviate significantly from
expectations. In the case of Venezuela we first fit the yes
share of the vote in the 2007 referendum, using the pro-
7Estimations were done by MLE, using the lme4 R package.
portions of the eligible electorate abstaining or support-
ing Chavez and Rosales in the 2006 presidential election
as explanatory variables — controlling for a small set of
socio-demographic variables, and then use the estimated
coefficients and 2007 electoral results to predict the yes
share of the vote in the 2009 referendum. The idea is to
check whether a subset of the polling places deviates con-
siderably from our forecast.
Of course, if fraud occurs in both elections in precisely
the same way and in the same localities, this method will
not detect anomalies. This fact, though, merely serves
to emphasize that our forensic indicators, taken together
or separately, are precisely that — indicators. None of
them, separately or together, can be said to ‘prove’ the
existence or absence of fraud. Much as in a criminal in-
vestigation, they merely provide evidence, out of which
we, as analysts, most form a coherent view of an election
— a view that is consistent with that evidence. There is
no black box into which we plug official election returns
and out of which comes a determination as to whether an
election was or was not tainted by significant fraud. Our
indicators provide us with alternative ways of looking at
official election returns and must, necessarily, be com-
bined with some substantive expertise about the society
and election at hand. Only the substantive expert can an-
swer such questions as: Were adequate controls in place
for heterogeneity in the population; are there alternative
explanations for why, for instance, increases in turnout
benefited only one candidate or party; did fraud take more
subtle forms so as to be undetectable by our indicators;
did issues arise in one election but not in others that give
that election a distinctly different character; or did one
candidate or another enjoy administrative advantages that
occasion suspicious patterns in the data but that cannot
be classified as illegal fraud? Only after these questions
are asked and answered can we begin drawing definitive
conclusions from our forensic indicators.
6 Results
Most of the analysis done for individual elections was
done using ‘mesa’ (table) level data. However, since the
number of tables changes within one same polling place
from election to election, the cross-election analysis was
done comparing polling-place level results. Specifically,
we used polling place IDs — constant across elections, to
exactly match 8,815 polling places which were open dur-
ing the three elections of interest. The average number of
voters and eligible voters per polling place in 2009 was
1,230 and 1,744, respectively.
It was very important for our analysis to count with
2007 turnout figures. Still, this information is not avail-
able at the CNE’s web site. To solve this issue, we esti-
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mated polling place level registration numbers for Decem-
ber 2007 by interpolating between the December 2006
and February 2009 official registration figures for each
polling place. Turnout rates were computed by taking the
total number of votes — including both valid and invalid
votes, as a percentage of the total number of registered
voters. According to the news reports, turnout in the 2007
constitutional referendum was approximately 56 percent.
Based on our own estimations, turnout in that election sit-
uated at 58 percent — with average and median figures of
57 percent and 59 percent, respectively. These figures are
substantively smaller than the 75 percent and 70 percent
officially reported for the 2006 presidential and 2009 con-
stitutional referendums, respectively — or 74 percent and
69 percent in our sample of matched polling places. Fig-
ure 1 compares the distribution of turnout across the three
elections. It shows that turnout was largest and had a rela-
tively low variance in 2006, then it decreased considerably
in 2007, and finally increased in 2009. The only slight
anomaly we observed in this completely pooled data is
some thickness in the right tail of the 2006 turnout distri-
bution.
Figure 1: Distribution of Turnout in Recent Elections
The official result of the 2006 presidential election was
a 64.8 percent Chavez victory, relative to the total num-
ber of valid votes. If instead we consider the proportion
of the eligible electorate, Chavez vote share was equal to
45.6 percent. Then, in the 2007 referendum, the no option
won the election corresponding to both bundles of con-
stitutional articles. Specifically, the no vote share stood
at 50.7 percent in the case of bundle A. If we consider
the proportion of the eligible electorate, the vote share re-
ceived by the no option — in bundle A, was equal to 29.7
percent. Last, the yes option won the 2009 referendum
with a 54.9 percent share of the vote — or 37.4 percent in
terms of the eligible electorate. Figure 2 shows the results
of the 2006 presidential election, and the 2007 and 2009
constitutional referendums, using ternary plots. The upper
vertices correspond to abstention, the lower left vertices
correspond to the alternative supported by the Chavismo,
and the lower right vertices correspond to the alternative
supported by the opposition. Any point within these tri-
angles indicates an election outcome — where the pro-
portions associated with the different alternatives add to
1. To interpret these figures, notice that standing at any
vertex, lines parallel to the opposite side represent similar
vote shares associated with the vertex’s label. Also, vote
shares decrease linearly as we move away from the vertex.
Since the centers of the triangles are equidistant from all
extremes, they represent a situation with the exact same
proportion of votes for each alternative.8 These figures
show that while the 2009 distribution of outcomes is very
similar in shape to the one observed in the 2006 presiden-
tial election, the 2007 constitutional referendum outcome
looks like a special case of relatively low turnout.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of turnout by state. In
general, state-level distributions follow the national pat-
tern observed in Figure 1. The most noticeable deviations
from the normal distribution occur in the 2006 presiden-
tial election — consistent with the thick right tail observed
in the distribution of national turnout, with some states
exhibiting relatively large second modes to the right — in
particular, this happens in Cojedes and Vargas. This last
state shows slightly multimodal distributions in all three
elections. Then, in 2007, there is a set of states whose
turnout distribution does not look normal, but slightly
skewed and with thick tails — we refer to Bolivar, Delta
Amacuro, Guarico and Zulia. Finally, in the case of
the 2009 referendum, most densities look unimodal and
tightly clustered around some point, and are not skewed
to any side — although Barinas and Tac´hira exhibit small
hills to the left, and Vargas to the right.
As mentioned in the previous section, both alternatives
should benefit partially from an increase in turnout — or,
at least, none should get hurt. A failure of this hypoth-
esis raises a ‘red flag’ about artificially inflated turnout
favoring one of the alternatives. To test it we plot the re-
lationship between turnout and the shares of the vote for
each alternative, by state, for sufficiently similar polling
places. The criteria for constructing subsets of similar
polling places by state, were splitting the data in two, de-
pending on whether the yes option won the previous elec-
tion in that polling place (see Figure 4), or whether the
opposite outcome took place (see Figure 5). In the case
of those regions where the yes won in 2007, we observe
slightly negative slopes in the no shares in the states of
Cojedes and Delta Amacuro. Also, in those regions where
8Actually, the abstention percentage represented in the ternary plots
includes both actual abstention as well as invalid vote. In the case of the
2006 presidential election and 2009 constitutional referendum, invalid
votes stood at 1.0% and 1.2%, respectively.
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Figure 2: Recent Election Outcomes
the no won in 2007, we observe negative yes slopes in sev-
eral states — Bolivar, Carabobo, Cojedes, Lara, Merida,
Portuguesa, Trujillo and Yaracuy. The most extreme cases
are Carabobo and Cojedes, where the yes share falls con-
siderably as turnout increases. In general, observed fig-
ures for the 2009 election are mostly consistent with our
hypothesis. A similar analysis of the 2007 election results
is also consistent with the hypothesis that both shares of
the eligible electorate benefit partially from an increase
in turnout. However, we do observe deviations from our
expectation in some states, which warns about potential
electoral fraud in some of the regions under considera-
tion. Since our hypothesis rests on the assumption of ho-
mogeneity across observations — i.e. observations which
only differ in turnout, deviations may also be due to het-
erogeneity not accounted for by our bivariate regressions
and scatter plots.
Next, we proceeded to analyze the patterns of digits of
the ‘mesa’ (table) level electoral results. Figure 6 shows
histograms with the density of the last digit for each alter-
native in the three elections of interest — the 2006 presi-
dential election, the 2007 constitutional referendum (bun-
dle A), and the 2009 constitutional referendum. In addi-
tion, we also include the density of the last digit corre-
sponding to the outcomes of bundle B of the 2007 con-
stitutional referendum. We do not observe any obvious
non-random pattern — such as 0/5 rounding, or avoidance
of zeros and fives. All last digits have approximately the
same 10 percent incidence. Also, Figure 7 shows matrix
plots of the density of the last two digits. Each cell corre-
sponds to a combination of a next-to-last (row) digit, and
a last (column) digit, with darker tones indicating larger
incidence. If individuals unconsciously avoid paired num-
bers such as 2 2, 3 3, and so on, then we should observe
white diagonals. However, this pattern does not show up
in any occasion — and neither does the opposite pattern
where people focus on 2 2, 3 3, and so on. In general, none
of the matrices shows an obvious non-random pattern in
the distribution of last two digits. A shortcoming of this
tool is that electronic fraud may be designed in such a way
that manipulation of the last digits is completely random.
If this were the case, this particular indicator would not be
useful to detect fraud.
After that, we turn to the analysis of the flow of votes
between different elections. Figure 8 shows the propor-
tion of the yes vote in the eligible electorate in 2009, as a
function of the same variable in 2007. We observe that
the proportion of support for the yes increases in most
polling places, especially where the yes vote was small
in 2007. Even though most polling places are clustered
around the regression line, some observations are far off.
Since deviations may be due to the aggregations of results
from dissimilar regions, we built Figure 9 showing com-
parable graphs by state. Again, state-level results show
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patterns similar to those observed at the national level,
though outcomes are more tightly clustered around the fit-
ted regression line. Some states, such as Aragua, Delta
Amacuro, and Distrito Capital exhibit small clusters of
polling places where the proportion of yes votes increased
considerably in 2009 relative to most voting centers.
To further learn about the flow of votes between elec-
tions, we estimated a set of Goodman equations similar
to the one represented by equations (1) through (3). Ta-
ble 1 shows the results with complete pooling, where each
equation is estimated by OLS. The model fits the data well
— with each equation explaining more than 95% of the
variance in the dependent variable. Still, three of the co-
efficients lie out of bounds. To mitigate the potential ag-
gregation bias, we re-estimated similar equations specify-
ing random coefficients by region. In total, we considered
366 regions — which in most states correspond to munic-
ipalities, except for the Distrito Capital and Vargas, where
our regions correspond to ‘parroquias.’ In this case, we
still find that two of the average coefficients are negative,
but closer to the [0,1] interval compared to the complete
pooling approach. The main result following from this ta-
ble is that voters who supported the yes option in 2007,
overwhelmingly support the yes option in 2009 — this is
not surprising because the 2007 reform proposal was even
more radical than the 2009 reform proposal. Similarly,
those voters who supported the no alternative in 2007,
overwhelmingly choose the no alternative in 2009. None
of these results is surprising.
The most interesting result corresponds to the flow of
votes of from those who abstained in 2007. Suppose all
of the increase in turnout observed between both elections
was artificial participation created by the government to
inflate the yes results. Then, the coefficient in the up-
per right corner should be relatively large. However, we
observe a different pattern. Approximately 56 percent of
those who abstained in 2007 continue to abstain in 2009.
And among those who choose to participate, two thirds
support the yes position, and one third support the no po-
sition. Thus, even though the yes alternative was the main
beneficiary of the increase in turnout, the no alternative
also received a fairly large proportion of the new vote.
Also, the random coefficients model is useful because it
allows us to detect regions deviating significantly from av-
erage estimates. Figure 10 shows that the random effects
associated with some of the regions were significantly dif-
ferent from the average effects. For instance, in the Ped-
ernales municipality of Delta Amacuro, the proportion of
the 2007 yes share received by the yes alternative in 2009
is equal to 146 percent, very out of bounds, and way above
the estimates from any of the remaining regions. Also,
in the case of Acevedo municipality in the state of Mi-
randa, the proportion of the 2007 no vote share received
by the no alternative is equal to 111%, an out-of-bounds
and relatively large estimate in comparison to other re-
gions. Table 3 shows the results of a similar estimation
with non-nested random effects by average age, gender
and proportion of rural population, for the first equation.
According to the deviance criterion — a measure of er-
ror — the model with random coefficients by region fit-
ted the data better than this second model. However, the
non-nested alternative allows us to learn about the deter-
minants of the effects. For instance, according to panel (c)
in Figure 11, the proportion of the 2009 yes vote originat-
ing from those abstaining or voting yes in 2007, decreases
with the proportion of rural population, while the opposite
happens with the proportion received from those voting no
in 2007.
Table 1: Flow of Votes between 2007 and 2009
Complete pooling, OLS estimation
Yes 07 No 07 Abst 07
Yes 09 0.99 -0.09 0.27
No 09 -0.15 1.02 0.13
Abst 09 0.14 0.05 0.58
Vertical sum 0.98 0.98 0.98
Table 2: Flow of Votes between 2007 and 2009
Random effects by region, M.L.E.
Yes 07 No 07 Abst 07
Yes 09 0.97 -0.08 0.28
No 09 -0.11 0.94 0.14
Abst 09 0.13 0.10 0.56
Vertical sum 1.00 0.96 0.98
Table 3: Flow of Votes between 2007 and 2009
Random effects by demographic indicators, M.L.E.
Yes 07 No 07 Abst 07
Yes 09 1.00 -0.07 0.27
No 09 -0.15 0.97 0.16
Abst 09 0.13 0.09 0.56
Vertical sum 0.98 0.99 0.99
Table 4 shows the results of a Goodman regression
analysis with random coefficients by region, to explain
the flow of votes between the 2006 presidential election
and the 2009 constitutional referendum. The main result
is that a substantial proportion (20 percent) of those who
voted for Chavez in 2006 abstained in the 2009 referen-
dum. Also, 94 percent of those who voted for Rosales in
2006 choose the no alternative in the 2009 constitutional
referendum, and 11 percent abstain. Second, 72 percent of
those who abstained in 2006, abstain again in 2009, while
the rest (20 percent), support the yes alternative. Table 5
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shows the results of a similar analysis to explain the flow
of votes between the 2006 and 2007 elections. In this case,
we find that 36 percent of those who voted for Chavez in
2006, decide to abstain in 2007. Also, among those voting
for Rosales in 2006, 87 percent vote no in 2007, while 19
percent abstain. Last, 77 percent of those who abstained
in 2006, also do in 2007, while 16 percent support the yes
alternative.
Table 4: Flow of Votes between 2006 and 2009
Random effects by region, M.L.E.
Chavez 06 Rosales 06 Abst 06
Yes 09 0.74 -0.09 0.24
No 09 0.04 0.94 0.04
Abst 09 0.20 0.11 0.72
Vertical sum 0.98 0.96 1.00
Table 5: Flow of Votes between 2006 and 2007
Random effects by region, M.L.E.
Chavez 06 Rosales 06 Abst 06
Yes 07 0.60 -0.08 0.16
No 07 0.03 0.87 0.08
Abst 07 0.36 0.19 0.77
Vertical sum 0.99 0.98 1.01
Our final indicator corresponds to a comparison of the
observed yes vote share in 2009, with a forecast of the yes
vote share for 2009. Predictions were computed using the
estimated coefficients of a model first fitted to the 2007
election results — with predictors including the 2006 out-
come, plus a set of socio-demographic control variables,
which explained 98 percent of the variance in the 2007
yes vote share. Figure 13 shows the result of this com-
parison. Most of the polling places exhibit larger than
expected vote shares, but we do not observe any group of
polling places located away from the rest of the data —
most points are clustered around a line with slope close to
one and positive intercept. The model did worst among
those polling places where the yes position was predicted
to obtain between 60 percent and 80 percent of the vote
— instead, many of those locations exhibited a yes vote
share between 80 percent and 100 percent.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we used a set of statistical tools to detect
outliers and anomalies in election returns in two recent
constitutional referendums in Venezuela where electronic
voting technologies were used. Studying the integrity of
these elections is challenging because manipulation of the
software used for electronic voting could lead to types of
fraud difficult to detect with some of our forensic indica-
tors. Still, the elimination of the presidential term lim-
its stood out as one of the main proposals in both con-
stitutional referendums. Assuming there were no consid-
erable socio-demographic changes in the population be-
tween both elections, it would be suspicious if the 2009
share received by the yes alternative changed dramatically
in polling places where the same position lost the election
in 2007. Even with a well designed electronic fraud, con-
siderable changes between both elections may be detected
with a careful analysis of the flow of votes.
Our main observation is that most of the new votes
received by the yes position came from polling places
with large abstention in 2007. Still, a third of those who
abstained in the previous election participated and sup-
ported the no position, implying that not all the increase
in turnout was artificially created by the government to
get the reform approved. Further, the new distribution of
turnout, as well as the election outcome, was very simi-
lar to that observed in the 2006 presidential election, sug-
gesting the 2009 election was one where turnout recov-
ered and people voted relatively similar to how they did
in 2006. Of course, if fraud took place in 2006 and it was
carried out in the same way as in 2009, then we would
not be able to detect it using our flow of votes analysis.
But this begs the question of why would the government
replicate the same type of manipulation in 2009, and not
in 2007? If they were capable of successfully conducting
fraud in 2006, they could also have used it to approve the
radical reforms proposed in 2007.
Even though we did not find evidence of widespread
electoral fraud taking place in the last referendum, we did
observe anomalies and outliers in different steps of our
study. For instance, the state of Delta Amacuro showed
both anomalies in the turnout distribution, as well as in
the relationship between vote shares and turnout. Further,
a municipality in the same state was prominent for hav-
ing a very large and out of bounds coefficient associated
with the share of the yes vote in 2007 ‘flowing’ to the
yes vote in 2009. However, this is no proof that electoral
fraud took place in Delta Amacuro. As we warned in the
methodological section, our indicators do not constitute,
by themselves, proof that electoral fraud did or did not
take place in any particular region, or in the country as a
whole. They should be interpreted by experts with knowl-
edge about the characteristics and heterogeneities of the
different areas, and employed as a complement to the in-
formation arising from pre- and post-election audits, as
well as reports from election observers.
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Figure 8: Relationship between yes shares in 2009 and yes shares in 2007. The red line represents the fitted results
of a linear regression between the proportion of yes votes in the 2007 constitutional referendum (bundle A), and
the proportion of yes votes in the 2009 constitutional referendum. The green line represents a situation where the










































































































































































































































    
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   


















































































































Figure 11: Goodman Regression Coefficients 
(deviations from mean) 
 








c- Random coefficients by rurality quantiles 
 
                                                 
9 1 indicates more than 50% female. 
Figure 11: Goodman regression coefficients by demographic differences (deviations from the mean), with dependent

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 12: Forecasted 2009 results versus actual 2009 results. Dependent variable: yes votes as a proportion of total
votes. Predictions were made based on the 2007 yes and no shares of the eligible electorate, using the estimated
coefficients corresponding to an OLS regression where the dependent variable was the 2007 referendum yes share,
and the independent variables were the 2006 Chavez and Rosales shares of the eligible electorate, plus a set of socio-
demographic variables.
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